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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider algorithms for distributed constraint op-
timisation problems (DCOPs). Using a potential game characteri-
sation of DCOPs, we decompose six distributed DCOP algorithms,
taken from the game theory and computer science literatures, into
their salient components. We use these components to construct
ﬁve novel hybrid algorithms. We then empirical evaluate all eleven
DCOP algorithms in a series of graph colouring experiments. Our
experimentalresultsshowtheexistenceofseveralperformancetrade–
offs, which may be exploited by a system designer to tailor a DCOP
algorithm to suit their mix of requirements.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
G.1.6 [Optimization]: Global optimization
General Terms
Distributed constraint optimisation, potential games
1. INTRODUCTION
Large–scale systems are difﬁcult to solve optimally, often because
communication restrictions make it difﬁcult, costly or impossible
to collect all the necessary information at the location where a so-
lution is to be computed. These difﬁculties then motivate the use of
distributed methods of optimisation. Given this background, much
attention has been focussed on using machine learning techniques
to solve or approximate solutions to large–scale optimisation prob-
lems (e.g. [3]). Within this context, in this paper, we focus on dis-
tributed constraint optimisation problems (DCOPs). Speciﬁcally,
we are interested in algorithms in which the actors are distributed
and can only communicate with their peers. For thus reason, we ex-
clude centralised approaches in which all of the information needed
to solve a problem is accessible to a single decision maker. We also
exclude distributed algorithms that rely on highly structured inter-
actions, such as algorithms that run on a pre-computed tree (e.g.
DPOP [16]), because such interactions often become prohibitively
costly as the size of the problems increases. We call the remaining
algorithms completely distributed algorithms.
Against this background, we use a uniﬁed analytical framework
based on potential games to decompose six of the major completely
distributed algorithms for DCOPs. We use the framework to con-
struct a number of novel learning algorithm hybrids. The potential
game framework allows us to construct these algorithms in a prin-
cipled manner. We then compare their performance to that of the
existing DCOP algorithms in a series of simulation experiments in
a graph colouring domain. By doing so, we identify the effects that
using various components have on the behaviour of an algorithm.
The paper progresses as follows. In the next section we introduce
our potential game characterisation of DCOPs. We begin Section 3
by describing our algorithm decomposition, and then ﬁt six existing
algorithms to this framework, before constructing our novel hybrid
algorithms. In Section 4 we discuss the results of a series of graph
colouring experiments. Section 5 concludes.
2. DCOPS AS POTENTIAL GAMES
This section begins with an overview of noncooperative games, be-
fore focusing on potential games in particular. We then introduce
constraint optimisation problems, and show how a DCOP may be
expressed as a potential game. This result is used in subsequent
sections, to construct a parameterisation of the design space for
DCOP algorithms, and to analyse their behaviour and explore the
algorithm design space.
2.1 Potential Games
A noncooperative game, hN,{Si,ui}i∈Ni, is comprised of a set of
agents N = 1,...,n, and for each agent i ∈ N, a set of strategies Si,
with ∪N
i=1Si = S, and a utility function ui : S → R. A joint strategy
proﬁle s ∈ S is referred to as an outcome of the game, where S is
the set of all possible outcomes, and each agent’s utility function
speciﬁes the payoff they receive for an outcome by the condition
that, if and only if the agent prefers outcome s to outcome s0, then
ui(s) > ui(s0). We will often use the notation s = {si,s−i}, where
s−i is the complimentary set of si.
An agent’s goal is to maximise its own payoff, conditional on the
choices of its opponents. Stable points in such a system are char-
acterised by the set of Nash equilibria, which are deﬁned as a joint
strategy proﬁle, s∗, such that no individual agent has an incentive
to change to a different strategy:
ui(s∗
i ,s∗
−i)−ui(si,s∗
−i) ≥ 0 ∀ si, ∀ i. (1)
The class of ﬁnite potential games are used to describe many prob-
lems in multi-agent systems, in particular congestion problems on
networks [18], and more recently, power control, channel selectionand scheduling problems in wireless networks [10, 11], target as-
signment problems [2] and job scheduling [23].
DEFINITION 1. A function P : S → R is a potential for a game
if ∀ i ∈ N:
P(si,s−i)−P(s0
i,s−i) = ui(si,s−i)−ui(s0
i,s−i) ∀ si, s0
i ∈ Si. (2)
A game is called a potential game if it admits a potential [15].
Intuitively, a potential is a function of action proﬁles such that the
difference induced by a unilateral deviation equals the change in
the deviator’s payoff. The existence of a potential function implies
a strict joint preference ordering over game outcomes. This, in turn,
ensures that the game possesses two desirable properties.
First, everyﬁnitepotentialgamepossessesatleastonepure–strategy
equilibrium [18]. To see this, let P be a potential for a game. Then
s is an equilibrium point for the potential game if and only if for
every i ∈ N,
P(s) ≥ P(s0
i,s−i) ∀ s0
i ∈ Si.
Consequently, if P admits a maximal value in S (true by deﬁnition
for ﬁnite S), then the game possesses a pure–strategy Nash equilib-
rium. Now, pure–strategy equilibrium are particularly desirable in
decentralised agent–based systems, as they imply a stable, unique
outcome. Mixed strategy equilibria, on the other hand, imply a
probabilistically stable, but stochastically variable strategy proﬁle.
Second, every potential has the ﬁnite improvement property [15].
An improvement step in a game is a change in one player’s strategy
such that its utility is improved. A path is a sequence of steps, f =
(s0,s1,s2...), in which exactly one player changes their strategy
at each step, and f is an improvement path in a game if for all t,
ui(st−1) < ui(st) for the deviating player i at step t. A game is said
to have the ﬁnite improvement property if every improvement path
is ﬁnite. Now, in a potential game, for every improvement path
f = (s0,s1,s2,...) we have, by Equation 2:
P(s0) < P(s1) < P(s2) < ...
Then, as S is a ﬁnite set, the sequence f must be ﬁnite, so every
potential has the ﬁnite improvement property. The ﬁnite improve-
ment property ensures that the behaviour of agents who indepen-
dently play ‘better-responses’ in each period of the repeated game
converges to a Nash equilibrium. Taken together, the two proper-
ties discussed above ensure that many simple adaptive processes
converge to a pure–strategy Nash equilibrium in potential games.
2.2 DCOP Games
We now consider DCOPs, and show that a game-theoretic formu-
lation of a DCOP is a potential game. This is important as it allows
us to apply the convergence results presented above to many other
algorithms, which, in turn, will allow us to structure our parameter-
isation of the DCOP algorithm design space in a principled manner.
A constraint optimisation problem is formally represented by a
set of variables V = {v1,vm,...}, each of which may take one of
a ﬁnite number of states or values, sj ∈ Sj, a set of constraints
C = {c1,c2,...}, and a global utility function, ug, that speciﬁes
preferences over conﬁgurations of states of variables in the system.
A constraint c = hVc,Rci is deﬁned over a set of variables Vc ⊂ V
and a relation between those variables, Rc, which is a subset of
the Cartesian product of the domains of each variable involved in
the constraint, Õvj∈Vc Sj. A function that speciﬁes the reward for
satisfying, or penalty for violating, a constraint is written uck(sck),
where sck is the conﬁguration of states of the variables Vck. Using
this, the global utility function aggregating the utilities from satis-
fying or violating constraints commonly takes the form:
ug(s) = å
ck∈C
uck(s).
This aggregation is strictly monotonic, in that an increase in the
number of satisﬁed constraints results in an increase in the global
utility. Constraints may be ascribed different levels of importance
by simply weighting the rewards for satisfying them, or by using a
positive monotonic transform of constraint reward [19]. The objec-
tive is then to ﬁnd a global conﬁguration of states, s∗, such that:
s∗ ∈ argmax
s ∈ S
ug(s).
Given this, a DCOP is produced when a set of autonomous agents
each independently control the state of a subset of the variables, but
share the goal of maximising the rewards for satisfying constraints.
A DCOP game is a simple formulation that explicitly model the
strategic dependencies between the variables each agent controls.
Without loss of generality, we consider the case where each agent
controls only one variable. As such, we can use the terms ‘state
of a variable’ and ‘strategy of an agent’ interchangeably, and will
notate the set of agents involved in a constraint by Nc. Finally, the
set of constraints that i is involved in is notated by Ci.
A DCOP game is formulated by assigning each agent a private util-
ity function, ui(s), which is dependent on both its own state and the
state of other agents in the system. There is some ﬂexibility in the
choice of utility function, however, it is vital that an agent’s utility
only increases when the global solution quality is improved. This
is done by setting each agent’s utility equal to its local effect on the
global utility function, which, in a DCOP, is given by the sum of
the payoffs for constraints that agent i is involved in:
ui(s) = å
ck∈Ci
uck(si,sn(i)).
Now, each agent desires to maximise its private utility, and agents
are allowed to adjust their strategies in repeated plays of the game.
Distributed solutions to the DCOP are produced by the independent
actions of the agents in the system. Consequently, these solutions
are located at the Nash equilibria of the DCOP game.
We now state the key result we have derived, and upon which the
rest of the paper hinges, placing DCOP games in the class of po-
tential games.
THEOREM 1. Every strictly monotonic DCOP game in which
the agents’ private utilities are given by their local effects on the
global utility function is a potential game.
PROOF. Since a change in i’s strategy only affects the neigh-
bours of i, n(i), the following statements hold:
ui(si,sn(i))−ui(s0
i,sn(i)) = å
ck∈Ci
uck(si,sn(i))− å
ck∈Ci
uck(s0
i,sn(i))
= å
ck∈C
uck(si,s−i)− å
ck∈C
uck(s0
i,s−i)
= ug(si,s−i)−ug(s0
i,s−i),
where the third line ﬂows from the second by deﬁnition.
Thus, ug is an exact potential function for a DCOP game where the
agents’ private utilities are given by their local effects on the value
oftheglobalutilityfunction. Consequently, anychangeinstatethatincreases an agent’s private utility also increases the global utility
of the system.
In the case of binary constraints, the game played between pairs
of agents sharing a constraint can be easily expressed in matrix
form. One widely studied binary constraint optimisation problem
is graph colouring, and in Section 4 we run a series benchmarking
experiments sing graph colouring as our problem. For these reason,
we present an example graph colouring game.
EXAMPLE 1. Ingraphcolouring, neighbouringnodessharecon-
straints, which are satisﬁed if the nodes are in differing states. Con-
sider the following graph colouring problem, where each node can
be either black or white, and the associated constraint game:
A B
C
uc(si,sj) =
B W
B (0, 0) (1, 1)
W (1, 1) (0, 0)
In this example, agents A and B each effectively play the game
above with agent C, while agent C plays the composite game be-
low, constructed by combining the constraint games it plays with
each neighbour. In the table below, A and B are column players
and C is the row player, payoffs are (uA, uB, uC).
sA, sB B, B B, W W, B W, W
sC B (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 2)
W (1, 1, 2) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0)
Finally, a potential function for the game is given below:
sA, sB B, B B, W W, B W, W
sC B 0 1 1 2
W 2 1 1 0
Now that we have shown that DCOP games are potential games, we
are assured that at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Furthermore, to prove that the globally optimal joint proﬁle corre-
sponds to a Nash equilibrium, assume that the optimal point is not
a Nash equilibrium. Then there must be some agent that can alter
its state to improve its utility, which in turn will improve the global
utility, which contradicts the assumption that the optimal point is
not a Nash equilibrium. Despite that, note that in most cases many
Nash equilibria exist, some of which will be sub-optimal.
In the next section we describe the processes by which agents ad-
just their states in order to arrive at an equilibrium. However, be-
fore continuing, we make one general comment regarding both the
interpretation of the repeated game and the strategy adaptation pro-
cess. We assume that agents suffer from extreme myopia, and do
not look beyond the immediate rewards for taking an action, so the
only Nash equilibria that are supported are the Nash equilibria of
the one-shot DCOP game.
3. DISTRIBUTED DCOP ALGORITHMS
A comparison of completely distributed algorithms for DCOPs is
worthwhile in itself, however, we are interested furthering the state
oftheartbyexploitingourpotentialgamecharacterisationofDCOPs.
To this end, we begin this section by introducing a uniﬁed frame-
work that captures the major completely distributed DCOP algo-
rithms. We then examine six existing algorithms from the game
theory and computer science literature, and ﬁt them to our frame-
work. These algorithms are: the distributed stochastic algorithm
(DSA) [6]; the maximum–gain messaging algorithm (MGM) [21,
13]; ﬁctitious play (FP) [5, 17]; regret matching (RM) [9]; spatial
adaptive play (SAP) [22]; and smooth ﬁctitious play (smFP) [7,
8]. Finally, we construct ﬁve hybrid algorithms, using components
taken from the six existing algorithms. These hybrid algorithms are
then evaluated alongside the six existing algorithms in the experi-
ments described in Section 4. Pseudo code for the algorithms is
given in Appendix A.
3.1 DCOP Algorithm Framework
The framework which use breaks a DCOP algorithm into three
components. To begin with, given an appropriate trigger, the indi-
vidual agents follow the same basic two–stage routine. First is the
state evaluation. Each algorithm has a target function that it uses
to evaluate its prospective states. The target functions are typically
functions of payoffs, and sometimes take parameters that are set
exogenously to the system or updated online. Second is a decision
on which action to take, based on the preceding state evaluations.
The decision rule refers to the procedure by which an agent uses its
evaluation of states to decide upon an action to take. The third com-
ponentisthesystem–wideprocessthatcontrolswhichagentadjusts
its state at each point in time, given by an adjustment schedule. In
many algorithms (particularly those addressed in the game theory
literature), the scheduling mechanism is often left unspeciﬁed, or
is implicitly random. However, some algorithms are identiﬁed by
their use of speciﬁc adjustment schedules that allow for preferen-
tial adjustment or parallel execution. Furthermore, in some cases
the adjustment schedule is embedded in the decision stage of the
algorithm. Note that communication does not ﬁgure explicitly in
this framework. Information is communicated between agents for
two purposes: (i) to calculate the value of their target function, or
(ii) to run the adjustment schedule. Thus, the communication re-
quirements of each algorithm depend on these two stages.
3.2 Existing DCOP Algorithms
Using the framework described above, we now decompose six ma-
jor DCOP algorithms into their constituent components, and exam-
ine how these components affect the algorithms’ properties when
they are used in repeated potential games.
3.2.1 Distributed Stochastic Algorithm
DSA uses the immediate payoff for selecting a state, ui(si,s−i) as
its target function, and for a decision rule, uses the argmax func-
tion (i.e., selects the state with the greatest payoff). As such, this
algorithm is effectively a greedy, local search algorithm. As an ad-
justment schedule, it employs a random parallel schedule, in which
each agent has some probability p, known as the degree of par-
allel executions, of actually changing their state at any time step
[23]. Thisadjustmentscheduleismotivatedbyobservingthatwhen
neighbouring agents adapt their states at the same time, they can in-
advertently move their joint state to a globally inferior outcome, a
phenomenon known as ‘thrashing’. The random parallel schedule
cannot ensure that no thrashing takes place, but by selecting an ap-
propriate value of p, or decreasing p along an appropriate schedule,
thrashing behaviour can be minimised. Additionally, the ﬁnite im-
provement property ensures that DSA almost surely converges to a
Nash equilibrium in repeated potential games.
3.2.2 Maximum–Gain Messaging Algorithm
Similar to DSA, MGM also uses the immediate payoff and argmax
function as a target function and decision rule, respectively. The
algorithms differ purely by the adjustment schedule they employ:
MGMusesaschedulethatgivepreferencetoagentsthatcanachieve
the greatest gains, which we call maximum–gain schedule. This in-
volves agents exchanging messages regarding the maximum gainthey can achieve. If an agent can achieve the greatest gain out of all
its neighbours, then it implements that change, otherwise it main-
tains its current state. The maximum–gain messaging adjustment
schedule avoids all thrashing, as no two neighbouring agents will
ever move at the same time. MGM converges to a Nash equilibrium,
and furthermore, is an anytime algorithm.
3.2.3 Fictitious Play
The term ‘ﬁctitious play’ is often used to denote a family of adap-
tive processes which use the expected payoff over historical fre-
quencies of actions as a target function. Let i’s belief over its oppo-
nents’ joint strategy proﬁles, qt
i(s−i), be given by the frequency of
times it observes each joint proﬁle. Each agent’s expected payoff
given this belief, FPt
i, is then:
FPt
i =å
S−i
qt
i(s−i)ui(si,s−i).
This target function can also be speciﬁed recursively, which only
requires agents to maintain a measure of the expected payoff for
each state, rather than the full action history:
FPt
i = 1/t
h
ui(si,st
−i)+(t −1)FPt−1
i
i
,
where ui(si,st
−i) is the ﬁctitious payoff to i for each element of Si
given its opponents’ proﬁle at t. In this subsection, we consider
the main version, referred to as FP, which uses the argmax deci-
sion rulein conjunction with the‘ﬂood’ adjustment schedule, under
which all agents adjust their state simultaneously. Now, all versions
of ﬁctitious play that use historical frequencies as a target function
and the argmax decision rule (regardless of the adjustment sched-
ule used) have the property that if play converges to a pure strategy
proﬁle, it must be a Nash equilibrium, because if it were not some
agent would eventually change their strategy. Additionally, strict
Nash equilibria are absorbing; if a strict Nash equilibrium is played
once it is played from then on.
Speciﬁcally regarding FP, in repeated potential games, this algo-
rithm converges in beliefs; that is, each agents estimate of its oppo-
nents’ strategies, which is used to calculate each of its own strat-
egy’s expected payoff, converges as time progresses [14]. Con-
sequently, each agent’s best response strategy also converge to a
Nash equilibrium proﬁle. This process induces some stability in
an agent’s choice of strategy, minimises thrashing and cycling be-
haviour, and generally speeds up convergence.
3.2.4 Regret Matching
Another approach that can be used to speed up convergence is to
measure the average ‘regret’ for not taking an action, written ARt
i,
where regret is the difference in payoff for choosing a state and the
state that was actually chosen at a particular time:
ARt
i = 1/t
t
å
t=1
[ui(si,st
−i)−ui(st
i,st
−i)]. (3)
This target function can be speciﬁed recursively, only requiring the
agents to maintain a measure of average regret for each state:
ARt
i = 1/t
h
ui(si,st
−i)−ui(st)+(t −1)ARt−1
i
i
.
This target function is used by [9] to construct the RM algorithm.
RM then takes these regret values and maps them through a linear
probabilistic decision rule to produce a mixed strategy with prob-
abilities in direct proportion to the target value of each state, with
negative regrets given zero probability:
Psi =
ui(si,st
−i)
åsi∈Si ui(si,st
−i)
.
Finally, agents choose not to change their state with a small proba-
bility proportional to the size of their strategy space and scaled by
the difference between their highest and lowest possible payoffs.
Thus, the algorithm effectively uses a random parallel schedule,
the same schedule as DSA. RM converges to the set of correlated
equilibria (a generalisation of Nash equilibria) in all ﬁnite games,
however, it does not necessarily converge to Nash equilibria.
3.2.5 Spatial Adaptive Play
Like DSA and MGM, SAP uses the immediate payoff for selecting
a state as its target function. However, it differs in both its deci-
sion rule and adjustment schedule. SAP uses the multinomial logit
decision rule [1], also known as the Boltzmann distribution:
Psi(h) =
eh−1ui(si,st
−i)
åsi∈Si eh−1ui(si,st
−i). (4)
Here states are chosen in proportion to their reward, but their rel-
ative probability is controlled by h, a temperature parameter. If
h=0thentheargmaxfunctionresults, whileh=¥producesauni-
form distribution across strategies, which results in the state of the
system following a random walk. The choice between the argmax
decision rule and a probabilistic decision rule serves an important
purpose. In the former case, the algorithm converges quickly, and
may even be anytime, but it may not be able to escape from the
basin of attraction of a local maximum. The latter case adds ergod-
icity to the algorithm, which allows it to escape from sub-optimal,
local maxima, but at the cost of sometimes degrading the solution
quality. Depending on the speciﬁcs of the problem at hand, the
temperature can be kept constant or may be decreased over time
according to some annealing schedule. The later case is referred to
in the online reinforcement learning literature as a ‘greedy in the
limit with inﬁnite exploration’ (GLIE) decision rule [20].
SAP also uses a sequential random adjustment schedule, which
randomly gives one agent at a time the opportunity to adjust its
strategy, with agents selected by some probabilistic process. The
motivation for using this adjustment schedule is grounded in the
convergence proofs for many of the adaptive procedures taken from
the game theory literature. In particular, the ﬁnite improvement
property of potential games directly implies that agents who play a
sequence of ‘better responses’ converges to a Nash equilibrium in
a ﬁnite number of steps. This property, in conjunction with results
regarding the convergence of GLIE processes,1 is used to prove the
convergence of SAP to the global optimum of the potential function
in repeated potential games [22, Chapter 6].
3.2.6 Smooth Fictitious Play
smFP uses the expected payoff over historical frequencies of ac-
tions as a target function and the ﬂood adjustment schedule, and so
differs from FP only in its use of a probabilistic decision rule. Typ-
ically, smFP uses the multinomial logit decision rule, which results
in a version of smFP that is known to converge to the set of Nash
equilibria in potential games [12].
3.3 Hybrid DCOP Algorithms
As noted in the introduction, one of our motivations for develop-
ing a parameterisation of the DCOP algorithm design space is an
interest in exploiting the potential synergies that exist by combin-
ing components of different existing algorithms. In this section, we
investigate ﬁve such hybrid algorithms constructed from the com-
ponents identiﬁed in the previous subsection, and guided by the
1For example, the appropriate annealing schedule for the logistic
decision rule is h µ 1/logt.properties of potential games. These particular hybrids were se-
lected because, ﬁrstly, we expect them to display the types syner-
gies we are interested in, and secondly, because they show that the
behaviour of an algorithm can be predicted by identifying which
components from our parameterisation are used in the algorithm.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst algorithm, greedy spatial adaptive play, re-
moves the stochasticity in state choice from SAP. The second and
third hybrid algorithms are spatial ﬁctitious play and distributed
stochastic ﬁctitious play, both which augment standard ﬁctitious
play with a new adjustment schedule. Fourth, smooth spatial ﬁc-
titious play adds stochasticity to the newly–described spatial ﬁcti-
tious play algorithm. Finally, the ﬁfth, maximum–gain message re-
gret matching, uses maximum gain priority to schedule the agents’
adjustment process. We note that other combinations of algorithm
components and parameter settings are possible, and indeed were
examined. However, here we report only these ﬁve as they are the
most interesting, the best performing, or give the clearest examples
of how altering a component of the algorithm affects its behaviour.
3.3.1 Greedy Spatial Adaptive Play
In greedy spatial adaptive play (gSAP), the multinomial logit de-
cision rule of SAP is replaced by the argmax function, with the
target function and random sequential adjustment schedule of SAP
retained. This substitution is motivated by the observation that, al-
though standard SAP converges to an optimal solution, it converges
very slowly [2], and that by removing the stochasticity in state de-
cisions, the algorithm will converge more quickly.
Of course, by using the argmax decision rule, the global optimality
of the long run (i.e. as t → ¥) solution produced by gSAP is lost,
but by the ﬁnite improvement property, the algorithm is still guar-
anteed to converge to a strict Nash equilibrium in potential games.
Consequently, in practice, we expect gSAP to produce relatively
good quality solutions in better time than SAP.
3.3.2 Spatial Fictitious Play
Spatial ﬁctitious play (SFP) is a combination of FP with SAP,
in which the asynchronous move adjustment schedule of SAP re-
places the simultaneous moves (ﬂood schedule) of standard FP,
while retaining the expected payoff over historical frequencies as
the target function and argmax as the decision rule. Such an algo-
rithm has been suggested in theory and has been shown to converge
in potential games [4], but has never been tested empirically.
Like gSAP and MGM, the convergence of this form of ﬁctitious
play is a corollary of the ﬁnite improvement property of ordinal
potential games. In more detail, under SFP, if player i switches
from si to s0
i, then there exists an improvement path from (s,s−i)
to (s0
i,s−i), so any sequence of switches traverses an improvement
path and consequently converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Besides its proven convergence properties, another motivation for
considering this algorithm is that a system in which agents move
asynchronously is closer to reality in most computational systems.
In particular, in distributed systems, the assumption of synchronous
moves, as in the ﬂood schedule, is somewhat dubious, so SFP is a
better ﬁt to many practical situations.
3.3.3 Distributed Stochastic Fictitious Play
In distributed stochastic ﬁctitious play (DSFP), agents use a ran-
dom parallel schedule rather than a ﬂood schedule as in FP. Like
SFP, expected payoff over historical frequencies as the target func-
tion and argmax as the decision rule are retained. Additionally, the
motivation for using such an algorithm in distributed systems is the
same as that of SFP.
Now, although DSFP has not been proven to converge, the general
results for all ﬁctitious play-like algorithms — stationary strategy
proﬁles are necessarily Nash equilibria and strict Nash equilibria
are absorbing [8] — hold, so we expected to see the algorithm con-
verge. Just as importantly, we predict that the effects of using dif-
ferent adjustment schedules are independent of the target function
used, a hypothesis which we can test by comparing DSFP to FP
and SFP, in conjunction with a comparison of DSA and gSAP.
3.3.4 Smooth Spatial Fictitious Play
Like SFP, agents using smooth spatial ﬁctitious play (smSFP) fol-
low a random sequential schedule rather than a ﬂood schedule. Ad-
ditionally, as in smFP, the logit decision rule is used, and expected
payoff over historical frequencies is retained as the target function.
Again, adding stochasticity should result in better quality solutions
at a cost in terms of an increase in the average convergence time.
Furthermore, by considering smSFP, we can test our prediction
that the effects of using a probabilistic decision rule are indepen-
dent of the target function used.
3.3.5 Maximum–Gain Message Regret Matching
In the maximum–gain message regret matching algorithm (MGM–
RM), agents use the maximum gain priority adjustment schedule.
Weconsiderthiscombinationbecausewebelievethatthemaximum–
gain messaging schedule will improve the speed of convergence of
the RM algorithm, as when used in an algorithm that also uses im-
mediate rewards as a target function, the algorithm produces better
solutions at each iteration.
4. EXPERIMENTS
we wish to test how the different algorithm components affect the
solutions generated by an algorithm. To this end, we benchmark
the algorithms discussed in the preceding section in a series of dis-
tributed graph colouring problems. Graph colouring, as well as be-
ing a standard problem addressed in the literature, can be broadly
applied as a formalism for modelling many important problems
in multi–agent systems, such as scheduling problems, channel se-
lection in wireless communication networks, and multi–agent re-
source allocation problems.
4.1 Experimental Design
The set of graph colouring problems we consider is made up of 60
random 80 node graphs. The number of states (colours) available
to the agents is varied so that the problems may be successfully
satisﬁed, with 20 graphs colourable in three colours, another 20
colourable in four colours and 20 colourable in ﬁve colours. The
mean connectivity (the average number of links per node) of each
graph is held constant at three for all the graphs considered.2 In
order to produce statistically signiﬁcant results, 50 runs of each
graph where completed by each algorithm. A run consisted of a
maximum of 80 cycles, which was seen to be adequate for most of
the algorithms to converge to a steady state.
The performance of each algorithm is measured by ﬁve metrics,
chosen so that we may identify the effects of the various algorithm
components. Three metrics are used to measure the optimality of
each algorithm. Firstly, the ratio of the average utility of the so-
lutions produced to the optimal, across all time steps, is used to
2Preliminaryexperimentsfoundthatalteringthemeanconnectivity
of the graph had no effect on the quality of the solutions produced.broadly compare the overall performance of algorithms. Secondly,
the average of the ratio of the utility of the solution at the termina-
tion of the run to the the optimal solution, is used to identify those
algorithms that may be slow to converge but, in the end, provide
high quality solutions. Thirdly, the proportion of runs in which the
algorithm ﬁnds an optimal solution is used to isolate those algo-
rithms that frequently produce an optimal solution. The speed of
convergence of each algorithm is summarised in the average time
it takes the algorithm to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium. We use Nash
equilibrium because, as predicted by the theory, we expect to see
the algorithms converging to sub–optimal Nash equilibria, and we
are interested in measuring the rate of convergence to a solution,
not the rate of convergence to an optimal solution. And ﬁnally,
the communication requirement of each algorithm is measured by
the average number of messages communicated per node per cycle.
Additionally, to clearly show the behaviour induced by the different
algorithms, we plot the average utility against time.
4.2 Results and Discussion
The simulation results are shown in Table 1, with 95% conﬁdence
intervals in parentheses. Where they are useful for illustrating in-
teresting behaviour, the relevant time series of the simulations are
presented in Figure 1. We begin our discussion of the results by
considering the six existing DCOP algorithms discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2: DSA, SAP, MGM, FP, RM, and smFP. We then relate
these results to those of the ﬁve novel hybrid algorithms discussed
in Section 3.3: gSAP, SFP, DSFP, smSFP and MGM–RM.
Regardingtheexistingalgorithms, considerﬁrsttheirsolutionqual-
ity. As predicted by the theory, RM frequently does not converge to
a Nash equilibrium (it is only guaranteed to converge to the set of
correlated equilibria) and rarely ﬁnds the optimal solution. How-
ever, the average utility and utility of the ﬁnal solution of the RM
algorithm are both very good. Beyond that, in absolute terms, all
of the remaining algorithms perform well. This is to be expected,
as all have proven convergence properties. In particular, SAP out-
performs all the existing algorithms. This advantage is particularly
noticeable in its ability to ﬁnd the optimal solution or a solution
very close to the optimal one by the termination of the simulated
run, as measured by the ratio of the solution’s utility at the termi-
nation to the the optimal utility and the proportion of runs in which
it ﬁnds an optimum. The reason for this is based in part on its
guaranteed asymptotic convergence to the global optimum, but as
importantly, on the fact that the sequential adjustment schedule en-
sures no thrashing occurs. The remaining algorithms — DSA(0.4),
MGM, FP and smFP– perform roughly equivalently by all three op-
timality criteria. Worthy of particular mention is the performance
of DSA(0.4). Wechose p=0.4asagoodrepresentativeofthespec-
trum of DSA algorithms as it provided very good solution quality in
a timely manner at a low communication cost. A marginal increase
in p only very slightly improved the speed of convergence, with lit-
tle or no improvement in the solution quality, and, consistent with
the results seen in [23], values of p < 0.85 saw a rapid deteriora-
tion in the solution quality and convergence speed of the algorithm.
Values of p < 0.4 saw a drop off in the speed of convergence with
no improvement in solution quality.
Second, we considered the speed of convergence of the existing
algorithms. The algorithms using expected reward over historical
frequencies of play as their target function, FP and smFP, both
converge very quickly, as can be seen in Figure 1. This result
matches well with the motivation for using ﬁctitious play–like al-
gorithms, and is an effect of convergence in the belief state used
by these algorithms. By comparing these two algorithms, we can
also draw an inference about the effect of adding stochasticity to
decision choice. Speciﬁcally, the smFP algorithm is constructed
by replacing the argmax function of FP with the multinomial logit
decision rule. This induces stochasticity, which should permit the
algorithm to move from low–payoff equilibria (or local maximum
of the potential function) to higher–payoff equilibria, or ideally a
global maximum. The cost of this behaviour is an increase in the
timetakenforastochasticalgorithmtoconverge. Thesepredictions
are indeed borne out in the observed behaviour of smFP compared
to FP. Adding stochasticity to the decision increases the propor-
tion of runs that produce an optimal solution by the termination of
the simulation by around 18%, while the average length of time to
convergence to Nash equilibrium increasing by around 40%. This
trade–off is seen in Figure 1, where FP outperforms smFP for the
ﬁrst 18 time steps. After 18 time steps, FP had almost always con-
verged, whereas at the same point, smFP’s solutions were still im-
proving, and continue to improve for another 10 or 20 time steps,
giving a better quality solution at the termination of the simula-
tion. These results indicate that the choice over whether to use a
stochastic decision rule depends on the user’s preference for im-
proved solution quality over increased search time. Regarding the
remaining algorithms, on average, both DSA and SAP converge rel-
atively quickly. This is a consequence of the adjustment schedules
they use: DSA converges quickly because it allows parallel execu-
tion of state adjustments, while SAP converges quickly because it
minimises thrashing and cycling behaviour. On the other hand, the
relatively slow convergence of MGM is also a result of its adjust-
ment schedule. RM does not necessarily converge to Nash equilib-
ria, so, unsurprisingly, has long convergence times.
Third, consider the communication resources used by the algo-
rithms. By this metric RM is the superior algorithm: RM comes
within 6% of the solution quality of SAP at 1/16th of the commu-
nication cost. Furthermore, both FP and smFP also use relatively
few messages, and taken together with RM, we conclude that the
averaging mechanisms employed by these algorithms act to sta-
bilise their choice of state, which reduces their communication use.
At the other end of the scale, the MGM algorithm is particularly
poor, due to the fact that the maximum–gain messaging schedule is
a two-stage adjustment process that requires at least one full round
of messages to be sent between neighbouring agents.
From looking at the performance of the existing algorithms, we can
makethefollowingcommentsregardingtheeffectsofusingvarious
algorithm components. Firstly, when using immediate payoffs as a
target function and the argmax decision rule, the random parallel
adjustment schedule produces lower convergence times and better
quality solutions than other algorithms using immediate payoffs as
a target function, because it limits the effects of thrashing while
allowing for a reasonable level of parallelisation. Secondly, FP and
smFP converge quickly, and rely on few messages. Thirdly, RM,
although it does not converge to Nash equilibrium, produces good
quality solutions using remarkably few messages. Fourthly, using
a stochastic decision rule improves the ﬁnal solution quality, but at
a cost of increased convergence time and increased communication
costs. Finally (and related to the previous comment), the optimal,
but slow, convergence of SAP is evident when its unremarkable
average utility is compared to the high–quality ﬁnal solutions and
high proportion of optimal conﬁgurations it produces.
We now consider the novel hybrid algorithms, and relate their per-
formance to that of the existing algorithms. Our aims in doing soTable 1: Graph Colouring Results
Average Ratio to Proportion Avg Time Avg
Algorithm Utility Optimum at T Optimal at T to Converge Comm.
DSA(0.4) 0.968 (0.001) 0.984 (0.001) 0.19 (0.01) 19.3 (0.3) 0.47 (0.01)
MGM 0.960 (0.002) 0.971 (0.002) 0.42 (0.02) 31.0 (1.0) 5.57 (0.05)
FP 0.964 (0.001) 0.972 (0.001) 0.25 (0.02) 8.7 (0.2) 0.32 (0.01)
RM 0.929 (0.001) 0.956 (0.001) 0.02 (0.01) 74.8 (0.4) 0.05 (0.00)
SAP 0.973 (0.001) 0.992 (0.000) 0.37 (0.02) 22.2 (0.3) 1.32 (0.03)
smFP 0.963 (0.001) 0.975 (0.001) 0.30 (0.02) 12.4 (0.2) 0.52 (0.01)
gSAP 0.983 (0.001) 0.990 (0.001) 0.69 (0.02) 5.3 (0.1) 0.94 (0.03)
SFP 0.966 (0.001) 0.971 (0.001) 0.24 (0.02) 7.9 (0.2) 0.45 (0.02)
DSFP(0.4) 0.958 (0.001) 0.969 (0.001) 0.21 (0.01) 19.2 (0.5) 0.19 (0.01)
smSFP 0.966 (0.001) 0.974 (0.001) 0.27 (0.02) 11.6 (0.3) 0.52 (0.02)
MGM–RM 0.931 (0.001) 0.955 (0.001) 0.03 (0.01) 70.0 (0.6) 3.97 (0.02)
are to test if the speciﬁc results above have more general applica-
bility, and to see if the predictions we made in Section 3.3 about
the performance of the novel algorithms are true.
First, regarding gSAP, by substituting the argmax rule for the logis-
ticdecision ruleusedin SAP,the convergencetime ofthealgorithm
is substantially reduced, but at a cost in terms of decreased solution
quality, as expected. However, as shown in Figure 1, the trade–
off is quite one–sided, with the average solution produced by SAP
only overtaking gSAP’s solution near the end of the simulation.
That said, longer simulations showed that the solutions produced
SAP continued to improve, while the average solution quality pro-
duced by gSAP remained at about the level seen in Table 1. This
difference is expected, because gSAP is prone to becoming stuck in
sub–optimal Nash equilibria, whereas in theory SAP will converge
to the global optimum. Also, the number of messages communi-
cated by gSAP is less than the number for SAP, which is a result of
its improved convergence time.
Second, SFP produces solutions of the same quality as the stan-
dard, synchronous moves FP, and converges slightly more quickly,
but with a 1/3 increase in the number of messages communicated.
Using asynchronous moves does nothing to alter the speed of con-
vergence of the beliefs used in these algorithms’ target function,
however, in the early stages of the run, it does act to reduce any
thrashing (as gSAP does in comparison to DSA) that may occur
before beliefs have begun to converge. Overall, this is a positive
result, because no loss of performance implies that FP or SFP may
be substituted for each other in real multi–agent systems, depend-
ing on the system designer’s ability to synchronise the actions of
the constituent agents.
Third, DSFP also produces solutions that are comparable in quality
to FP, nut the use of a random parallel schedule does slow down
the convergence of the algorithm and reduces its ability to ﬁnd an
optimal conﬁguration of states. That said, it produces solutions us-
ing considerably fewer messages than either FP or DSA, because,
agents are given fewer opportunities to change their state under the
random parallel schedule than under the ﬂood schedule, converg-
ing beliefs in the expected payoff over historical frequencies of ac-
tions target function act to reduce thrashing and cycling behaviour.
These results are indicative of a synergy in combining the DSA and
FP algorithms. Furthermore, in comparison to RM, another algo-
rithm that requires very few messages to run, DSFP(0.4) is 51/2
times more likely to ﬁnd an optimal conﬁguration.
Fourth, smSFP exhibits an increase in the proportion of runs in
which it ﬁnds the optimal solution by the termination of the simu-
lation is offset by an increase in the time it takes for the algorithm
to converge, when compared to SFP. This is a result of using a
probabilistic decision rule, and corroborates with the comparisons
of gSAP to SAP and FP to smFP. The quality of the solutions pro-
duced by smSFP is comparable to FP, smFP and SFP. Addition-
ally, in comparison to smFP, smSFP converges more quickly. This
is more evidence for the ability of the sequential random schedule
employed by SAP, gSAP, SFP and smSFP to speed up the conver-
gence of an algorithm.
Fifth, using the maximum gain messaging schedule did little to im-
prove the quality of the solutions produced by using average re-
gret as a target function and a linear decision rule. This is because
the states suggested by the target function and decision rule do not
necessarily improve the solution quality, causing the algorithm to
‘stick’ in conﬁgurations that are not Nash equilibria.
When taken together, these results indicate that gSAP and SAP are
the best performing algorithms evaluated here. However, the mag-
nitude of their superiority over some of the other algorithms may be
exacerbated by our choice of metric. In particular, compare gSAP
to DSA (the same comparison can be made between, on one side,
SAP, FP, smFP, SFP and smSFP, and on the other side, MGM,
DSFP and MGM–RM). In 80 cycles, gSAP provides 80×n individ-
ual adjustment opportunities to agents in the system. DSA, on the
other hand, only provides p×80×n adjustment opportunities (in
the case of p = 0.4, 32×n). This skews some of the metrics in the
favour of gSAP. If we adjust the average ratio of the utility to the
optimum results by comparing average solution quality of gSAP up
to t = 32 to the average solution quality of DSA(0.4) at t = 80, we
ﬁnd values of 0.972 and 0.968, respectively. Similarly, to compare
the average convergence time of gSAP and DSA(0.4), we can mul-
tiply the result for DSA by p, giving a scaled average convergence
time of 0.4×19.3 = 7.72. While in general these adjusted results
do not alter the ranking of the algorithms, they do indicate that the
differences in performance between the algorithms are not as large
as indicated by the raw ﬁgures.
In summary, the main effects of using different parameterisation
components are as follows. First, the random parallel adjustment
schedule limits the effects of thrashing, however this trait is only
useful in algorithms that use immediate payoffs as a target func-
tion, as other target functions use averaging techniques (i.e. beliefs
or average regrets) to eliminate thrashing and cycling. Second, the
sequential random adjustment schedule always improves the con-
vergence time of an algorithm, but for target functions other than0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
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Figure 1: Average Utility vs. Time
immediate payoffs, it does not improve solution quality. Third, due
to the averaging mechanism they employ, algorithms that use the
expected payoff over historical frequencies of actions as a target
function converge quickly and rely on few messages, because few
time–steps are wasted in thrashing and cycling behaviours. Fourth,
RM produces good quality solutions using remarkably few mes-
sages, again due to the averaging mechanism it employs, but does
not converge, and furthermore, its performance cannot be improved
by employing alternative adjustment schedules. Finally, using a
stochastic decision rule improves the ﬁnal solution quality, but at a
cost of increased convergence time and increased communication
costs.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on completely distributed algorithms for
DCOPs. Our three contributions are: (i) the development of a
three–stagedecompositioncommontomanycompletelydistributed
DCOP algorithms, (ii) the construction of ﬁve novel hybrids algo-
rithms based on the algorithm decomposition, and (iii) an evalu-
ation of these algorithms alongside six existing algorithms taken
from the game theory and computer science literatures. Further-
more, our experimental results show that an algorithm’s behaviour
is accurately predicted by identifying its constituent components.
Thus, using these results, a system designer may tailor a DCOP al-
gorithm to suit their mix of requirements, whether they be high
quality solutions, rapid convergence, asynchronous execution or
low communication costs.
Future work involves examining dynamic constraint optimisation
problems, in which constraints vary over time, both in response to
external factors and as a result of the agents’ choice of states. We
also aim to extend the analysis in this paper to other types of prob-
lems in multi–agent systems, such as resource and task allocation
problems and distributed management of congested networks.
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A. ALGORITHM PSEUDOCODE
Thefollowingpsuedocodedecribesthealgorithmsusedinourbench-
marking experiments. First we give code for the six existing algo-
rithms, followed by the ﬁve novel algorithms.
In all that follows, we denote an agent’s neighbours’ joint strategy
proﬁles−i andtargetfunction’svalueforstrategy j asstateValue(j)
or stateRegret(j), as appropriate. The pseudocode states the com-
putations carried out by an individual agent, and unless otherwise
stated, the algorithms are implemented by each agent running the
stated procedure at each time step.
A.1 Existing Algorithms
The six existing algorithms listed discussed in Section 3.2 are the
distributed stochastic algorithm, the maximum-gain messaging al-
gorithm, ﬁctitious play, smooth ﬁctitious play, regret matching, and
spatial adaptive play.
DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC ALGORITHM
currentValue = ui(si= currentState,s−i)
for j = 1:J
stateRegret(j) = ui(si=j,s−i)− currentValue
end for
candidateState = argmax
j
[stateRegret]
if rand[0,1] ≤ p
newState = candidateState
end if
if newState 6= currentState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if
MAXIMUM–GAIN MESSAGING
currentReward = ui(si= currentState,s−i)
for j = 1:J
stateGain(j) = ui(si=j,s−i)− currentReward
end for
bestGainState = argmax
j
[stateGain]
bestGainValue = stateGain(bestStateGain)
sendBestGainMessage[allNeighbours, bestGainValue]
neighbourGainValues = getNeighbourGainValues[allNeighbours]
if bestGainValue > max[neighbourGain] then
newState = bestGainState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if
FICTITIOUS PLAY
for j = 1:J
stateValue(j) = 1
t [ui(si=j,s−i)+(t −1)stateValue(j)]
end for
t = t +1
newState = argmax
j
[stateValue]
if newState 6= currentState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if
SMOOTH FICTITIOUS PLAY
for j = 1:J
stateValue(j) = 1
t [ui(si=j,s−i)+(t −1)stateValue(j)]
end for
t = t +1
for j = 1:J
statePropensity(j) = exp[h−1stateValue(j)]
end for
normFactor = å
J
j=1 statePropensity(j)
randomNumber = rand(0,1)
for j = 1:J
mixedStrategyCDF(j) = 1
normFactor å
j
k=1 statePropensity(k)
if randomNumber ≤ mixedStrategyCDF(j) then
newState = j
break for loop
end if
end for
if newState 6= currentState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if
REGRET MATCHING
currentValue = ui(si= currentState,s−i)
for j = 1:J
avgDiff(j) = 1
t (ui(si=j,s−i)− currentValue +(t −1)avgDiff(j))
stateRegret(j) = max[avgDiff(j),0]
end for
t = t +1
µ = (J−1)*(max[ui(j,l)]−min[ui(k,m)])+ rand(0,1)
for j = 1:J
stateProbability(j) = 1
µstateRegret(j)
end for
stateProbability(currentState) = 0
stateProbability(currentState) = 1−å
J
j=1 stateProbability(j)
randomNumber = rand(0,1)
for j = 1:J
mixedStrategyCDF(j) = å
j
k=1 stateProbability(k)
if randomNumber ≤ mixedStrategyCDF(j) then
newState = j
break for loop
end if
end for
if newState 6= currentState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end ifIn SAP, the agents adjust their state in a random sequence. In prac-
tice, there are a number of ways to implement this type of schedule,
however, we simply randomly select an agent to run the stated pro-
cedure. For benchmarking purposes, we consider one time step to
be completed when n (80) updates are completed. Note this can,
and usually does, mean some agents may be given more than one
opportunitytoadjusttheirstateinaparticulartimestep, whileother
agents may have none.
SPATIAL ADAPTIVE PLAY
currentValue = ui(si= currentState,s−i)
for j = 1:J
stateRegret(j) = ui(si=j,s−i)− currentValue
end for
for j = 1:J
statePropensity(j) = exp[h−1stateRegret(j)]
end for
normFactor = å
J
j=1 statePropensity(j)
randomNumber = rand(0,1)
for j = 1:J
mixedStrategyCDF(j) = 1
normFactor å
j
k=1 statePropensity(k)
if randomNumber ≤ mixedStrategyCDF(j) then
newState = j
break for loop
end if
end for
if newState 6= currentState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if
A.2 Novel Hybrid Algorithms
TheﬁvenovelhybridalgorithmsdescribedinSection3.3are: greedy
spatial adaptive play; spatial ﬁctitious play; distributed stochastic
ﬁctitious play; smooth spatial ﬁctitious play; and maximum–gain
message regret matching algorithm.
Regarding SFP and smSFP, these algorithms use the same agent
procedure as the standard FP and smFP algorithms, respectively.
Then, as in SAP, in SFP and smSFP the agents adjust their state in
a random sequence, which is implemented as discussed above.
gSAP uses the same procedure as SAP to randomly order agents’
state adjustments.
GREEDY SPATIAL ADAPTIVE PLAY
currentValue = ui(si= currentState,s−i)
for j = 1:J
stateRegret(j) = ui(si=j,s−i)− currentValue
end for
newState = argmax
j
[stateRegret]
if newState 6= currentState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if
The remaining algorithms are implemented by each agent running
the stated procedure at each time step.
DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC FICTITIOUS PLAY
for j = 1:J
stateValue(j) = 1
t [ui(si=j,st
−i)+(t −1)stateValue(j)]
end for
t = t +1
candidateState = argmax
j
[stateValue]
if rand[0,1] ≤ p
newState = candidateState
end if
if newState 6= currentState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if
MAXIMUM–GAIN MESSAGE REGRET MATCHING
currentValue = ui(si= currentState,s−i)
for j = 1:J
avgDiff(j) = 1
t (ui(si=j,s−i)− currentValue +(t −1)avgDiff(j))
stateRegret(j) = max[avgDiff(j),0]
end for
t = t +1
µ = (J−1)*(max[ui(j,l)]−min[ui(k,m)])+ rand(0,1)
for j = 1:J
stateProbability(j) = 1
µstateRegret(j)
end for
stateProbability(currentState) = 0
stateProbability(currentState) = 1−å
J
j=1 stateProbability(j)
randomNumber = rand(0,1)
for j = 1:J
mixedStrategyCDF(j) = å
j
k=1 stateProbability(k)
if randomNumber ≤ mixedStrategyCDF(j) then
candidateState = j
break for loop
end if
end for
candidateGainValue = ui(si= candidateState,s−i)− currentValue
sendGainMessage[allNeighbours, candidateGainValue]
neighbourGainValues = getNeighbourGainValues[allNeighbours]
if candidateGainValue > max[neighbourGain] then
newState = candidateState
sendStateMessage[allNeighbours, newState]
end if